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LAW AND MORALITY IN H.L.A.
HART'S LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
WILLIAM C. STARR*
I. CRITICISM AND UNDERSTANDING
It is a mistake to make generalizations about two oppos-
ing theories of law: natural law and legal positivism.' Both
theories level charges against the other. Some are percep-
tive; others are unfounded. What is less well known, but
equally true, is that historically both the natural law defend-
ers and the proponents of legal positivism have disagreed as
much among themselves as with their opponents. 2 If pro-
gress is to be made in legal philosophy by studying the works
of important legal philosophers, it will be made by carefully
examining the theories developed, rather than by attaching a
label to the philosopher and then assuming certain things
about that legal philosopher because the label has been at-
tached. This is particularly true of the works of H.L.A. Hart.
To better understand H.L.A. Hart, it is worthwhile to
discuss some general comments made by those legal philoso-
phers not sympathetic to legal positivism. Generally, natu-
ral law asserts several principles that are irreconcilable with
legal positivism. Most importantly, natural law finds that
there is a necessary, not a contingent, relationship between
law and morality. According to natural law theory, when
there is a conflict between natural law and human law, natu-
* B.A., California State University, Los Angeles, 1970; M.A., California State
University, Los Angeles, 1971; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1977;
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Marquette University.
A draft of this essay was presented to the philosophy department at Marquette
University in September 1983. The author would like to thank those present for a
stimulating discussion of the issues presented.
1. Recently, Ronald Dworkin has offered what has been called a third theory of
law, that is, a theory of law which is neither natural law nor legal positivism. See R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY chs. 2-4, 13 (1977). See also J.L. MACKIE,
THE THIRD THEORY OF LAW, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1-17 (1977); H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS
ON BENTHAM 147-53 (1982).
2. Defenders of natural law such as Cicero, Aquinas, Groitus, Locke, Blackstone,
Kant, and Fuller have major disagreements as to which version of natural law is
preferable. Defenders of legal positivism such as Bentham, Austin, Mill, Gray, Kel-
sen, Hart, and Raz also have major differences with each other.
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ral law must take precedence. In this regard, natural law
dictates that all human-made laws must be in accordance
with fundamental natural law principles, such as Aquinas'
notions of doing good, avoiding evil and promoting the com-
mon good. The natural law proponent believes that all law
must be morally justified if it is to be legitimately called
"law" at all.4 Thus, any morally acceptable legal order must
acknowledge natural law and incorporate its fundamental
tenets.
However, there have been occasions where natural law
defenders have made some unfair remarks about legal posi-
tivism. One commentator has said, "[p]ositivism, in theory,
does not recognize as scientific any knowledge beyond that
which can be acquired through the senses. It can never,
therefore, assert what men should do; but only what they
actually do."5 Another commentator has stated that "[1]egal
positivism is a view according to which law is produced by
the ruling power in society in a historical process. In this
view law is only that which the ruling power has com-
manded, and anything which it has commanded is law by
virtue of this very circumstance." 6  According to
Bodenheimer, the legal positivist insists on a separation of
positive law from ethics and tends to identify justice with
legality.7 Finally, Fuller, one of Hart's staunchest opponents
for the past twenty-five years, explains:
[T]he analytical positivist sees law as a one-way projection
of authority, emanating from an authorized source and im-
posing itself on the citizen. It does not discern as an essen-
tial element in the creation of a legal system any tacit
cooperation between lawgiver and citizen; the law is seen
3. See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA §§ 90-97 (S. Parry ed. 1966) (Ques-
tions).
4. Some natural law proponents expand this basic principle even further by as-
serting that one is not morally obligated to obey a law which does not meet acceptable
moral standards. The issue of whether one is allowed to actively resist an immoral
law is resolved differently depending upon which version of natural law one adheres
to.
5. R. BEGIN, NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAW 49 (1959).
6. Moor, Das Problem des Naturrechts, 28 ARCHIV FOR RECHTSUND WIRT-
SCHAFrSPHILOSOPHIE 331 (1935), quoted in E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 94-95
(1974) (footnote omitted).
7. E. BODENHEINER, supra note 6, at 94.
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as simply acting on the citizen - morally or immorally,
justly or unjustly, as the case may be.8
These remarks are typical of the critics of legal positiv-
ism. However, they display a lack of understanding of legal
positivism. This deficiency is particularly true with respect
to H.L.A. Hart. Hart is clearly the leading contemporary le-
gal positivist in Anglo-American jurisprudence. This status
is acknowledged by both his critics and defenders alike. Yet
it seems many neglect to look deeply enough at his view on
morality and the law. This article will explain the basic
premise of Hart's philosophy and demonstrate that Hart (a)
believes that certain fundamental principles of justice are re-
quired for a legal system; (b) takes the relationship between
law and morality extremely seriously; (c) finds that there is
much in natural law theory which any philosophically de-
fensible theory of law must include; and (d) is a critical,
moral philosopher as well as an analytical legal philosopher.
II. RULES: PRIMARY, SECONDARY AND ULTIMATE
In order to understand Hart as a critical, moral philoso-
pher, it is important to understand the analytical basis of
Hart's legal philosophy. Hart believes that there are two dif-
ferent types of rules which comprise the "essence" of law:
primary rules and secondary rules. The importance of dis-
tinguishing between these two types of rules, while recogniz-ing their interrelation, should not be minimized. Hart
described their relationship in The Concept of Law:
The main theme of this book is that so many of the distinc-
tive operations of law, and so many of the ideas which con-
stitute the framework of legal thought, require for their
elucidation reference to one or both of these two types of
rule, that their union may be justly regarded as the "es-
sence" of law, though they may not always befound together
whenever the word "law" is correctly used9
Hart stated that "law may most illuminatingly be character-
ized as a union of primary rules of obligation with such sec-
8. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 192 (1969).
9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 151 (1961) (emphasis added).
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ondary rules."' 0 Hart referred to this union as the "heart" of
the legal system."
Primary rules are "duty imposing" rules. They impose
certain specific duties upon the citizens of a state to act in a
certain manner, or they may be subject to certain legal sanc-
tions. Hart characterizes primary rules as "basic" rules.
They tell the citizen what one can and cannot do under the
law.' 2 For instance, laws setting speed limits, laws prohibit-
ing trespassing or laws prohibiting corporations from requir-
ing their employees to make contributions to political
campaigns are all examples of primary rules. Primary rules
are generally what the ordinary citizen means when he refers
to something as "the law."
Primary rules stand in contrast to secondary rules. Hart
explained the difference between the two types of rules:
[U]nder rules of the one type, which may well be consid-
ered the basic or primary type, human beings are required
to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to
or not. Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic upon
or secondary to the first; for they provide that human be-
ings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new
rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or
in various ways determine their incidence or control their
operations. Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of
the second type confer powers, public or private. 13
Secondary rules are not duty-imposing rules. They are what
Hart calls power-conferring rules. They state the manner in
which primary rules may be recognized, changed and adju-
dicated. For example, they grant Congress the power to leg-
islate and private citizens the right to vote. They state the
procedure one must follow in order to make a legal will. 14
Secondary rules are, as Hart puts it, "rules about primary
rules."
10. Id. at 91.
11. Id. at 93.
12. Marcus Singer, in his excellent review of The Concept of Law, 53 J. PHIL. 203-
04 (1963), correctly noted that Hart's primary rules do not seem to accommodate
"permissive" rules since Hart stated that they impose duties. However, this deficiency
is remediable. There is nothing wrong with extending the notion of primary rules to
permit, as well as to require and to forbid.
13. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 78-79.
14. The power to make a legal will is a secondary rule. The key here is that there
is a legally valid way to recognize the will-making procedure. The citizen has the
power to avail himself or herself of this opportunity.
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Hart explained:
[Secondary rules] may all be said to be on a different level
from the primary rules, for they are all about such rules; in
the sense that while primary rules are concerned with the
actions that individuals must or must not do, these secon-
dary rules are all concerned with the primary rules them-
selves. They specify the ways in which the primary rules
may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated,
varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively
determined. 5
Secondary rules are necessary in any reasonably complex so-
ciety. There must be procedures to discover just what the
primary rules are and how they can be changed or chal-
lenged. This task falls to secondary rules. This union of pri-
mary and secondary rules captures for Hart the essence of a
legal system.
Hart categorizes secondary rules as either rules of recog-
nition, rules of change, or rules of adjudication. Rules of
recognition provide a mechanism for discovering just what is
or is not a legitimate primary rule. In a semi-developed le-
gal system, these rules of recognition may be simply a refer-
ence to an authoritative text or standard for properly
identifying the primary rules that have thus far been estab-
lished. As a society becomes more complex, the criteria used
to identify primary rules will also become more complex.
"The criteria so provided may. . . take any one or more of
a variety of forms: these include reference to an authoritative
text; to legislative enactment; to customary practice; to gen-
eral declarations of specified persons, or to past judicial deci-
sions in particular cases."' 6 These various criteria may also
be in a hierarchical order; for example, statutes may take
precedence over custom.'7 Moreover, constitutional provi-
sions, judicial decisions and legislative enactments have their
own hierarchical order. Consider the following case. The
City of Milwaukee passes a law which forbids the sale of
alcoholic beverages on Sunday before 12:00 noon. The mu-
nicipal ordinance will control if there is no state statute regu-
lating this area. The ordinance may also be held invalid by
15. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 92 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 97.
17. Id. at 92-93.
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a judicial decision, if it confficts with a constitutional provi-
sion. Thus, the legal system itself in the United States con-
sists of a vertical hierarchy, with the federal constitution at
the apex of that hierarchy.
Another type of secondary rules are rules of change.
These are necessary to efficiently allow primary rules to be
amended. They specify how primary rules may be changed.
For instance, the United States Constitution can be
amended,' 8 and statutes can be repealed or modified by
later statutes.
The third type of secondary rules are rules of adjudica-
tion. These rules are essential to a legal system of a complex
society and are intended to remedy the inefficiency of a legal
system with just primary rules.' 9 Rules of adjudication set
criteria for determining when a primary rule has been bro-
ken and what procedure is to be followed when the primary
violation has been established. Judges, commissions, and
regulatory agencies are given authority when the occasion is
appropriate to apply secondary rules of adjudication.
The great advantage of having secondary rules in a given
legal system, complementing the primary rules, is that cer-
tain specific criteria are available to determine just what pri-
mary rules are in effect, how they can be changed, and what
the appropriate sanction is when a given violation of a pri-
mary rule occurs. As Hart stated, "These secondary rules
provide the centralized official 'sanctions' of the system. '20
This is the case since secondary rules of adjudication confer
power upon the judge to officially sanction the legal disobe-
dient in a manner in accordance with his or her authorized
power. Primary rules impose duties upon the citizen not to
violate the particular legal rules at issue. This model of law,
essentially a union of primary and secondary rules, is for
Hart the essence of a legal system.2'
18. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
19. H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 94.
20. Id. at 95.
21. There are problems with the concept of law as essentially a union of primary
and secondary rules. For example, Ronald Dworkin argues that Hart's notion of pri-
mary and secondary rules does not allow for legal principles which are also essential
in a complete concept of law. See generally R. DWORKIN, supra note 1.
[Vol. 67:673
HLA. HART
However, Hart recognizes that there also has to be an
ultimate rule to unite the legal system into a coherent whole.
Hart believes that the last court of appeal serves this purpose
by deciding whether a rule is part of a given legal system.
Accordingly, he calls this rule the "ultimate rule of recogni-
tion."22 Hart explained that:
The rule of recognition providing the criteria by which the
validity of other rules of the system is assessed is in an im-
portant sense, which we shall try to clarify, an ultimate rule:
and where, as is usual, there are several criteria ranked in
order of relative subordination and one of them is
supreme.2
3
The idea here is that in a legal system one rule will govern
when the legal validity of a law is called into question. Con-
sider the case when the constitutionality of a law is called
into question. Assume that a state passes a law which re-
quires health service agencies to notify the parents of a mi-
nor considering having an abortion, and that law is
challenged as an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty
under the fourteenth amendment. If the United States
Supreme Court undertakes to decide the issue, its interpreta-
tion of the Constitution will govern the country. Thus, the
Supreme Court provides the ultimate rule of recognition in
the United States.
Hart's ultimate rule of recognition is less applicable in
the United States, because of the separation of power princi-
ple, than it is in Great Britain. In Britain there is no written
constitution. Moreover, Britain's constitutional law is based
on the notion of parliamentary supremacy. This, of course,
is not the case in the United States. In our country we have
a written constitution. The United States Supreme Court,
through the mechanism of judicial review, interprets and ap-
plies the constitution. Thus, in the United States, instead of
holding "what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law," our
ultimate rule of recognition is something like "what the Con-
stitution says as interpreted by a majority of the members of
the Supreme Court is law." This rule is not as simple or
22. This analysis has been influenced through discussion with Professor Haskell
Fain of the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
23. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 102 (emphasis in original).
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clear as the British ultimate rule of recognition. However, it
gets even more complex. The Supreme Court does not have
to review all cases that come before it. Thus, some constitu-
tional issues may not be "ultimately" resolved. In our sepa-
ration of powers form of government, the Supreme Court
may invoke the "political question" doctrine and refuse to
make a legal ruling on a sensitive political issue. So, because
of American federalism and the doctrine of separation of
powers, it is impossible to have one ultimate rule of recogni-
tion which can resolve all legal disputes.24 It is no accident
Hart chose the British system to illustrate the idea of the ulti-
mate rule of recognition. Thus, for Hart the ultimate rule of
recognition is most clearly expressed by stating "what the
Queen in Parliament enacts is law." This rule unites the le-
gal system's primary and secondary rules into one legal sys-
tem. Any legal rule in the system can have its validity traced
back to the ultimate rule of recognition which is the supreme
legal rule. The union of primary and secondary rules, to-
gether with the ultimate rule of recognition, is what Hart
believes to be the essence of a legal system.
III. LAw AND MORALITY
If this union of primary and secondary rules represented
the entirety of Hart's legal philosophy, those who claim that
Hart's legal positivism has nothing of interest to say about
the relationship between law and morality would be correct.
They would also be correct in claiming that such an analysis
is grossly deficient. However, Hart does have more to say
about this subject. Much of what he says is perceptive and
illuminating.
Hart is a legal positivist, but he is a critical moral philos-
opher as well. Legal positivism generally means that it is in
no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy cer-
tain demands of morality, though in fact they have often
done S0.25 It is worth noting that Hart does not subscribe to
all the theses commonly attributed to legal positivism. He
24. It is beyond the scope of this essay to further develop Hart's ultimate rule of
recognition in relation to the United States. These illustrations are only intended to
provide a brief overview of the concept of the ultimate rule of law.
25. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 81-82.
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does not assert that laws are simply a product of sovereign
command, or that moral judgments cannot be established as
statements of facts can, by rational argument, evidence or
proo 26 He does not maintain that a legal system is a closed
logical system in which correct decisions can be deduced
from predetermined legal rules by logical means alone.
It should be noted that Hart does take morality seriously.
Hart stated that law and morality are very close, though not
necessarily related. He is deeply sympathetic to what he
calls "the core of good sense of natural law" and believes
that law should continually be subject to moral scrutiny.
Hart endorses the formal principle of justice as desirable
in any legal system. This basic principle of fairness empha-
sizes that laws should treat like cases alike, and different
cases differently.28 This constancy is necessary to give moral
legitimacy to a legal order. Now one should be careful not
to put too much weight on this principle, as the commentator
Frankena perceptively reminded us through the following
example. The mad king of Transylvania had just called all
of his subjects together. He showed them a huge vat of acid,
which, if one were to jump into it, would cause instantane-
ous death. He ordered all of his subjects to jump into the vat
and then jumped in himself. The formal principle of justice
was adhered to; yet the principle did not successfully ground
a moral system. 9 Material principles were clearly needed as
well.
Impartiality in rule application is a moral standard
which, according to Hart, is necessary in a legal system.
Thus, any judge applying a particular legal rule is expected
to do so uninfluenced by, to use Hart's words, "prejudice,
interest, or caprice." 30 Once again, however, the notion of
impartiality will not take us too far down the road to moral-
ity. Hart himself noted "[t]hough that most odious laws may
26. This concept is known in ethics as noncognitivism.
27. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 253. Austin held a version of the sovereign
command theory; Kelsen held to the moral judgment concept. To my knowledge no
legal positivist has ever held the closed logical system theory, an indefensible position.
28. See id. at 155.
29. Frankena, The Concept of Social Justice, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 17 (R. Brandt ed.
1962).
30. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 202.
1984]
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be justly applied, we have, in the bare notion of applying a
general rule of law, the germ at least ofjustice. ' ' 31 This is not
the same as the formal principle of justice since the judge
could show adherence to the principle of formal justice and
yet be influenced by "prejudice, interests or caprice."
Hart holds that law is an instrument of social control.
This means that the rules of law must satisfy certain condi-
tions if they are to properly achieve this goal. For instance,
citizens may reasonably expect that the rules of law will not
be retroactively applied.32 A principle of fairness is involved
here. Citizens should have both the ability and opportunity
to obey the law. So, the principle of formal justice, a princi-
ple of impartiality, and the principle of fairness are all built
into Hart's concept of law. This is a moral beginning, but
only a beginning.
It is appropriate now to turn to a crucial concept in un-
derstanding Hart's legal philosophy and its moral dimen-
sion. Hart holds that one can look at a legal order from two
different perspectives. First, there is the external point of
view. When one looks at a legal order from an external
point of view, one observes how members of a different soci-
ety act with respect to its legal system. The' observer is
outside the legal system. So, when he or she observes that
people in the system regularly obey the law, observable reg-
ularities of behavior can be noted and recorded. The ob-
server is in the role of the social scientist, dutifully recording
the behavioral patterns of the individuals in society. It is
important to recognize that the observer can explain what
people are doing within the system, but he or she cannot ex-
plain why they are doing it. The observer can note that the
citizen has obeyed the law, but can never ascertain whether
the citizen believes that he or she has a moral obligation to
obey that law.33 It is as if the observer is looking at the legal
system through a one-way mirror.
Hart believes that to determine whether a citizen believes
he or she has a moral obligation to obey the law, the system
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 86-88.
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must be viewed from an internal point of view.34 The inter-
nal point of view is applied by one who is a member of a
legal system and accepts it as a legitimate legal system. The
internal point of view differs from the external point of view
in that it offers one the opportunity to understand why citi-
zens believe the law should be obeyed. Hart reiterates that it
is not necessary in applying the internal point of view that
one obey the law for moral reasons. Clearly, most people
sometimes stop at stop signs not because it is the right thing
to do, but because there might be a police officer lurking
nearby. Nevertheless, the most stable and well-ordered legal
system will be one whose citizens and public officers gener-
ally apply the internal point of view for moral reasons. Hart
in this context wrote:
What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective
attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a common stan-
dard, and that this should display itself in criticism (includ-
ing self-criticism), demands for conformity, and in
acknowledgements that such criticism and demands are
justified, all of which find their characteristic expression in
the normative terminology of "ought," "must," "should,"
"right," and "wrong. ' 35
Hart does believe that law and morality have a very close
relationship. Individuals often use moral language in ex-
plaining the justification for obeying the law. And public
officials use moral language to explain and justify why they
legislate, enforce, and adjudicate the law.36
There is more. Hart believes that there is a minimum
content to natural law theory that a legal system must incor-
porate.37 Hart wrote:
We have, indeed, insisted that in all moral codes there will
be found some form of prohibition of the use of violence,
34. For a discussion of Hart's views, see R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DoMESTIC
COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 23-24 (1969) (noting that Kelsen
missed the crucial distinction between the external and the internal point of view).
35. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 56.
36. See Austin, A Pleafor Excuses, 57 P.A.S. 15 (1956-57), for a discussion of the
distinction between "excuse" and "justification."
37. Hart's minimum content of natural law has been discussed previously. See
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 24-26 (K. Winston ed. 1981).
The point here is to emphasize the context of Hart's use of natural law within his
overall legal philosophy. Hart's endorsement of the minimum content of natural law
is one component of his view on the relationship between law and morality. He skill-
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to persons or things, and requirements of truthfulness, fair
dealing, and respect for promises. These things, granted
only certain very obvious truisms about human nature and
the character of the physical world, can be seen in fact to
be essential if human beings are to live continuously to-
gether in close proximity; and it therefore would be ex-
traordinary if rules providing for them were not
everywhere endowed with the moral importance and status
which we have described. It seems clear that the sacrifice
of personal interest which such rules demand is the price
which must be paid in a world such as ours for living with
others, and the protection they afford is the minimum
which, for beings such as ourselves, makes living without
others worth while. These simple facts constitute . . . a
core of indisputable truth in the doctrines of Natural
Law.38
Hart's version of natural law is empirical.39 His position
is based on a theory of human nature which believes in cer-
tain truisms.40 For example, Hart believes that one truism of
human nature is that the overwhelming majority of human
beings wish to survive; in other words they would rather live
than die.41 If we wish to survive, it is imperative that a soci-
ety be developed which will help ensure survival. Hart be-
lieves there are five features of the human condition which
sometimes work against survival, and the legal system must
take these into account.42
First, there is the feature of human vulnerability.
Human beings can be harmed, and it is up to the legal sys-
fully shows how close this relationship is. This also has strong overtones for the con-
cept of human nature and the subject of moral psychology.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to further develop these issues. The point is
that there are several important ways in which Hart recognizes the close relationship
between law and morality. The core of natural law is one of these ways.
38. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 176 (emphasis in original).
39. His debt to Hobbes and especially Hume are obvious. See T. HOBBES, LEvI-
ATHAN Parts I and 11 (1651); D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE Part III, § 2
(1738). It is not based on a more traditional natural law resting on a specific type of
metaphysics, epistemology, or theology. This type can be found in various ways in
such classical philosophers as Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant or Locke.
40. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 187.
41. Hart did not maintain, as Fuller claimed he did, that "survival furnishes the
core and central element of all human striving." See id. at 187.
42. For analogous reasoning in moral philosophy, see generally G.J. WARNOCK,
THE OBJECT OF MORALITY (1971).
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tern to develop appropriate laws prohibiting one from harm-ing another. Second, there is the Hobbesian notion of
approximate equality. All humans can be relatively equal in
power and intelligence since they can form alliances to de-
feat opponents. As a result we have to compromise our
desires and settle our conflicts of interest peacefully. For
Hart, this is the core of both legal and moral obligation.
Hart expressed this view in the following passage:
Even the strongest must sleep at times and, when asleep,
loses temporarily his superiority. This fact of approximate
equality, more than any other, makes obvious the necessity
for a system of mutual forbearance and compromise which
is the base of both legal and moral obligation. Social life
with its rules requiring such forbearance is irksome at
times; but it is at any rate less nasty, less brutish, and less
short than unrestrained aggression for beings thus approxi-
mately equal.43
Third, Hart believes in the truism that human beings
possess at best a limited altruism. Both law and morality
force us to look beyond ourselves and live together peace-
fully with others in society.44
Fourth, Hart believes that the concept of limited re-
sources governs our actions. We simply cannot have every-
thing we want. Law is necessary to adjudicate competing
claims. It is also necessary to institute the concept of prop-
erty and provide for its protection. Thus, through law one
will be able to keep what he or she is legally entitled to
possess.
Fifth, Hart believes that the idea of limited understand-
ing and strength of will is important to any society. The law
protects us from others and ourselves through its coercive
framework. Of course, the entire notion of paternalism is
controversial in contemporary legal philosophy.45 How far
43. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 191.
44. James Madison said that if men were angels, there would be no need for
government. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison). Hart's addition could easily
be that if men were devils, there would be no need for government either.
45. See, e.g., Beauchamp, Paternalism and Bio Behavioral Control, 60 MONIST 62
(1977); Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONIST 64 (1972); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY
AND MORALITY (1979); J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1159).
Paternalism is the idea that one can either be forced to do something or prohibited
from doing something on the grounds that it is "for one's own good." Paternalism is
1984]
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the government has a moral right to have paternalistic laws
is difficult to ascertain, but Hart seems to allow for some de-
gree of paternalism.46  Hart concluded the discussion of
these five features of the human condition by noting:
The simple truisms we have discussed not only disclose the
core of good sense in the doctrine of Natural Law. They
are of vital importance for the understanding of law and
morals, and they explain why the definition of the basic
forms of these in purely formal terms, without reference to
any specific content or social needs, has proved so
inadequate.47
So, Hart asserts that there is a core of morality in every legal
system. Thus, to seriously maintain that legal positivism is a
priori unsympathetic to all varieties of natural law is to
make an unsubstantiated claim.
It is sheer nonsense and a gross misrepresentation of le-
gal positivism to maintain that legal positivism holds that
law and morality do not interact with each other and that
law is not concerned with morality. This is true of criticisms
of all the legal positivists, but it is especially true in the case
of Hart. Hart carefully explained that there is a close rela-
tionship between law and morality,48 emphasizing that:
The law of every modem state shows at a thousand points
the influence of both the accepted social morality and
wider moral ideals. These influences enter into law either
abruptly and avowedly through legislation, or silently and
piecemeal through the judicial process. In some systems,
as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal valid-
ity explicitly incorporate principles of justice or substantive
moral values; in other systems, as in England, where there
are no formal restrictions on the competence of the
not concerned with forbidding one to harm others; it is concerned with forbidding
harm to oneself. Examples of paternalistic laws are statutes which require one to
wear a helmet while riding a motorcycle, require one to wear a seatbelt while driving
an automobile, or forbid one to swim at a public beach without a lifeguard present.
46. H.L.A. HART, supra note 45, at 31-33.
47. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 194.
48. Chapters 8 and 9 of The Concept of Law are explicitly devoted to this issue.
The issue is treated throughout many of Hart's articles as well. See, e.g., H.L.A.
HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1979); H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1965); H.L.A. HART PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1960); Hart,
Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 827 (1979); Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. Rnv. 593 (1958);
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supreme legislature, its legislation may yet no less scrupu-
lously conform to justice or morality. The further ways in
which law mirrors morality are myriad, and still insuffi-
ciently studied: statutes may be a mere legal shell and de-
mand by their express terms to be filled out with the aid of
moral principles; the range of enforceable contracts may be
limited by reference to conceptions of morality and fair-
ness; liability for both civil and criminal wrongs may be
adjusted to prevailing views of moral responsibility. No
"positivist" could deny that these are facts, or that the sta-
bility of legal systems depends in part upon such types of
correspondence with morals. If this is what is meant by the
necessary connexion of law and morals, its existence
should be conceded.49
Can anyone possibly doubt that Hart recognizes the in-
terrelationship between law and morality when one consid-
ers this passage and the other ways in which it has been seen
that Hart clearly believes that law and morality are closely
related? But Hart refuses to take the final step and find that
morality is a necessary condition of legal validity. He re-
fuses for two reasons.
The first reason is practical; Hart is sympathetic to the
empiricist tradition which has been prevalent in British phi-
losophy for the past several centuries. 50 He believes that we
can obtain a better understanding of law in society by devel-
oping a philosophical position consistent with the way law
actually operates in the real world. In this sense Hart is a
descriptivist, not a prescriptivist.51
Hart explains that we can more accurately describe a le-
gal system if we take a wider view of what the law is. This
view includes all laws which are upheld under the ultimate
rule of recognition, even though some of these rules may be
immoral. This view can be contrasted with a narrower con-
cept of law as espoused by most natural law theorists, which
49. H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 199-200.
50. Empiricism posits that we obtain factual knowledge through our senses. All
knowledge is obtained this way except for tautologies or logical truths, for example,
the truths of deductive logic and mathematics. Hart comes of this Humean tradition.
So, we learn about the concept of law by observing how legal systems actually operate
in the world, not by merely creating a theory in a vacuum.
51. See J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 21 (1980), for further
elaboration.
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holds that immoral rules, even if they are authorized by the
legal system as a primary or secondary rule, are not to be
considered as law at all. Hart explained:
It seems clear that nothing is to be gained in the theoretical
or scientific study of law as social phenomenon by adopt-
ing the narrower concept: it would lead us to exclude cer-
tain rules even though they exhibit all the other complex
characteristics of law. Nothing, surely, but confusion could
follow from a proposal to leave the study of such rules to
another discipline, and certainly no history or other form
of legal study has found it profitable to do this.52
On this point Hart asserted that it is more important for a
philosopher to offer an accurate description of a legal system
than to prescribe a method of invalidating laws on moral
grounds. Hart believes that there must be a strong correla-
tion between a philosophical analysis of law and the way law
actually operates in the real world. Thus Hart rejects any
such "law in philosopher's heaven" model. 3
The second reason for Hart's refusal to find that morality
is a necessary condition for legal validity is moral. Hart
stated:
So long as human beings can gain sufficient co-operation
from some to enable them to dominate others, they will use
the forms of law as one of their instruments. Wicked men
will enact wicked rules which others will enforce. What
surely is most needed in order to make men clear sighted in
confronting the official abuse of power, is that they should
preserve the sense that the certification of something as le-
gally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience,
and that, however great the aura of majesty or authority
which the official system may have, its demands must in
the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny-5 4
This argument is a moral argument.55 Hart stated that it
is a mistake to maintain that the enactment of a law is deflni-
52. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 205.
53. The phrase was Ronald Dworkin's. Dworkin also rejected the idea of law in
philosopher's heaven.
54. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 205-06.
55. This interpretation was influenced by Neil MacCormick's study, H.L.A.
HART 158-62 (1981). However, I disagree with MacCormick's conclusion that this
passage showed that Hart could not maintain that law and morality have a contingent
relationship. Hart has shown this in the sense that immoral laws are still laws. It is
then another question whether a particular immoral law ought or ought not be
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tive with respect to the moral question whether the law
ought to be obeyed. Hart emphasizes that law is morally
relevant; it is not morally conclusive. Laws exist because
they meet legal structural standards necessary for a particu-
lar social rule to be called a law. Once enacted the law is
still subject to moral scrutiny. If a law is immoral, a ques-
tion arises as to whether the law ought or ought not be
obeyed. Numerous factors must be considered in deciding
on a course of action. Is the law horribly immoral? Is
change likely by going through official channels? Will
others support disobedience? Is punishment likely for diso-
bedience? There are no universally accepted solutions.56
IV. HARMONY
Hart's legal position and his critical morality are consis-
tent with each other. Hart, the legal positivist, develops a
model of law which he believes is both philosophically de-
fensible and in accord with the way law is practiced in the
real world. Hart, the critical moral philosopher, implores
both judicial officials and ordinary citizens to require that
the legal system meet an acceptable standard of morality in
both its content and application. The law should be con-
stantly subjected to moral scrutiny by society. If certain laws
do not meet such a standard or, in a more extreme case, the
legal system itself does not meet an acceptable moral stan-
dard, an appropriate course of conduct must be determined.
This is when hard choices must be made. Of course, moral-
ity should affect legal validity. Tragically, there are occa-
sions when it does not. Only a simple person would claim
there are simple answers. Hart knows this, and in this re-
spect develops a theory of law based on sound moral
principles.57
obeyed. On the whole, though, MacCormick's book is excellent and strongly recom-
mended to the reader.
56. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 206-07, where Hart seems to suggest this
himself.
57. One can find utilitarian, Kantian and rights-based aspects of morality in
Hart; he would hold all are essential in a comprehensive moral theory.
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